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DISCRIMINATION LAW-STANDARDIZED TESTING IN E.M.H. 
PLACEMENT: WHAT STANDARD Is STANDARD? PASE v. Hannon, 3 
EHLR 552:108 (1980). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Standardized tests have become familiar to American youth, 
and much of a young person's future is predicated upon scores 
achieved on these examinations. Standardized tests may be admin­
istered by public or private schools,l professional organizations,2 
testing centers, 3 or personnel offices. 4 Examination scores fre­
quently determine the extent and type of educational opportunities 
an individual will have, the type of job he is qualified to perform, 
or the salary he may receive. Until recently, most Americans have 
allowed these test scores to determine the course of their lives. 5 
In Parents in Action on Special Education v. Hannon6 (PASE) 
the use of three standardized tests was challenged when the test 
results were used to establish school placement classifications for 
children. Parents in Action on Special Education (PASE) brought 
suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois, claiming that the use of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for 
Children (WISe),7 the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children­
1. Wechsler Scales, Stanford-Binet, and other IQ, ability, or achievement tests 
are administered by public or private schools. 
2. Passing scores on bar examinations, teacher certification examinations, and 
other competency tests are required for membership within various professions. 
3. The Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), Law.School Admission Test (LSAT), 
and Graduate Record Exam (GRE) are examples of tests administered by the Educa­
tional Testing Service of Princeton, New Jersey, one center for standardized test de­
velopment and evaluation. 
4. Wechsler Scales, Miller Analogy Test, and various other interest inventories 
and aptitude tests occasionally are administered by personnel offices prior to place­
ment of employees into particular jobs. 
5. Such scores undoubtedly continue to affect those who take standardized 
tests. Recently, the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & West Cum. 
Supp. 1981), has provided avenues through which test takers may challenge the use 
of test scores that determine their future. Although not perfect solutions to the prob­
lems generated by testing programs, such laws encourage a more considered use of 
tests and test scores. 
6. 3 EHLR 552: 108 (1980) (memorandum opinion). 
7. The Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (1949) [hereinafter referred to 
as WISC) is a frequently used individual intelligence test. WISC consists of eleven 
subparts which test general comprehension, arithmetic, similarities, vocabulary, digit 
span, picture completion, picture arrangement, block design, object assembly. 
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. Revised (WISC-R),8 and the Stanford-Binet9 tests had a discrimina­
tory impact upon black children within the Chicago school sys­
tem. 10 The tests were used by the Chicago school administration as 
a means to assistll them in placing children in classes for the edu­
cable mentally handicapped (EMH).12 When two black children 
with learning disabilities were misdiagnosed and classified as edu­
cable mentally handicapped, PASE alleged violations of the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,13 Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964,14 the Education of All Handicapped Chil­
dren Act of 1975,15 and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973.16 
Judge John F. Grady, in a detailed opinion,17 examined each 
question on the three tests and determined that few of the items 
were discriminatory. 18 The judge made this finding by considering 
coding, and mazes. See D. WECHSLER, WECHSLER INTELUGENCE SCALE FOR 
CHILDREN, MANUAL 9 (1949). 
8. The Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised (1972) [hereinafter 
referred to as WISC-R] subtests are identical to WISC, except that mazes have been 
eliminated and some of the questions have been updated to reflect current education 
concepts. See note 39 infra. In addition, the population sample used to standardize 
the test has been changed. 
9. The Stanford-Binet test attempts to discern whether a child is perfonning at 
his age level. If a chilcfs perfonnance is below the mean for his age group he is said 
to have a "mental age" below his chronological age. See 3 EHLR at 552:108. The 
most recent revision of this test was completed in 1960. 
10. P ASE alleged that a statistically significant number of black children were 
placed into Educable Mentally Retarded [hereinafter referred to, as EMH] classes 
due to poor scores on the standardized tests. P ASE also alleged that the tests were 
racially or culturally biased. The use of such tests, therefore, had a discriminatory 
impact upon black children. 3 EHLR at 552: 110 n.2. 
11. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. § 1404 
(1976), which mandates that a standardized test score cannot be the sole criteria for 
placement of students into special education classes. See also 3 EHLR at 552:137. 
12. See text accompanying notes 56-58 infra. 
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970). 
15. Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401, was amended by the 
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 
(1975). Both versions contain requirements that school districts must meet in order to 
obtain federal funding of programs for handicapped children. 
16. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 1980). 
17. The opinion examines all test questions on the WISC, WISC-R, and 
Stanford-Binet tests. Judge Grady's opinions about the test questions and the expert 
testimony are included in the decision. 
18. 3 EHLR 552:108. Judge Grady found one item on the Stanford-Binet test 
and eight items on the WISC and WISC-R tests which he believed were culturally 
biased against black children or sufficiently suspect to be inappropriate. Id. See also 
note 123 infra. 
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both parties' expert witness testimony. Judge Grady, independent 
of that testimony, determined that the tests were not racially 
biased. 19 Without reaching the legal issues of discriminatory impact 
or intentional discriminatory treatment, Judge Grady entered judg­
ment for defendant. Judge Grady believed that the controversy was 
in essence a factual one and that it was unnecessary to reach the 
legal issues. Since he did not believe that the tests were racially 
biased, plaintiffs were unable to prevail on any of their theories. 
The fact that a significantly larger number of black children 
were placed into EMH classes provided the judge with undisputed 
evidence that the classification program had a disproportionately 
greater impact upon the black student population. Courts must 
look to the effect of classification programs to determine whether 
the scheme used by the school system has an impact that is dispro­
portionately greater upon one group than upon others. 
Part II of this note presents an overview of testing and school 
classification systems. This section examines the various concepts of 
intelligence that have been considered in developing standardized 
tests, the legal reaction to pupil classification schemes, and the ed­
ucation available to children within EMH classes. Part III surveys 
the cases that developed the theories of disparate treatment and 
disparate impact and then explains when each of these theories 
should be applied. The constitutional and statutory theories pre­
sented by PASE will be analyzed in part IV of this note. Part V 
considers the way Judge Grady framed the question before him 
and the way he disposed of the issue. 
This note will demonstrate that the courts must go beyond a 
lengthy evaluation of specific test items in their attempt to elimi­
nate discriminatory placement of children. Plaintiff need not prove 
that intentional discrimination has. occurred. When disparate im­
pact upon a protected group by any classification scheme is proved, 
an injunction should issue against use of that scheme and the 
courts should require the school system to develop a nondis­
criminatory means of classification. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The courts historically have been reluctant to intrude into the 
realm of educational policymaking. Courts have felt that educa­
19. 3 EHLR at 552:110. Judge Grady chose to disregard certain expert testi­
mony relating to the bias of test questions. Instead, he used his personal knowledge 
as a basis for ruling on the questions he considered to be suspect. [d. at 552:111. See 
also note 123 infra. 
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tional policy is the province of educators rather than of jurists. 
When educational policy appears to violate the United States Con­
stitution or a federal statute,20 however, the courts' reluctance is 
overcome by judicial resolve to protect this most important phase 
of American life. The United States Supreme Court has spoken of 
education as "perhaps the most important function of state and lo­
cal govemments."21 Chief Justice Warren, in Brown v. Board of 
Education,22 wrote: "[i]n these days it is doubtful that any child 
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the 
opportunity of an education. "23 Chief Justice Warren's statement is 
as true today as it was in 1954. . 
Once a state has established a system of free public education 
it must maintain that system in a manner that does not deny its 
children their constitutionally protected rights. 24 Any classification 
scheme which· places students into discrete groups by virtue of 
some characteristic must withstand constitutional scrutiny.25 When 
a fundamental right is not at stake26 or when a suspect class is not 
involved,27 the court applies a rational relation test. 28 Under this 
test the state merely needs to show that the action it has taken is 
rationally related to the legitimate goals it hopes to accomplish. 29 
20. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (segregated 
schools deny students equal protection of the law even though tangible facilities may 
be equal); United States v. Sunflower County School Dist., 430 F.2d 839, 841 (5th 
Cir. 1970) (use of achievement test scores to assign students was not permissible 
when schools were being operated as a dual school system, even though a marked 
racial imbalance existed within the school system); United States v. Tunica County 
School Dist., 421 F.2d 1236, 1237 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 951 (1970) (court 
disallowed the use of achievement test scores to reassign pupils to schools after 
desegregation was ordered); Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist., 419 
F.2d 1211, 1216 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971) (dissolution of seg­
regated school systems and court order for integrated unitary schools); Spangler v. 
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501, 521 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (racial imbalance 
among students and faculty, the use of a neighborhood school policy, and a policy 
against busing were held to violate the fourteenth amendment and indicated the 
need for affirmative integration of the school system). 
21. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
22. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
23. Id. at 493. 
24. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1975). 
25. Id. 
26. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-35 (1972) (education 
is not considered a fundamental right by the Supreme Court; rather, the provision of 
education is legislatively mandated by the states. Id. at 33-38). 
27. Id. at 22-28. 
28. Id. at 40. 
29. Cuyahoga County Ass'n for Retarded Children & Adults v. Essex, 411 F. 
Supp. 46, 50 (N.D. Ohio 1976). 
1981] STANDARDIZED TESTING 825 
The state is responsible for the development and implementa­
tion of an educational system. If a inechanism within that system 
classifies students, it will be subject to judicial scrutiny.30 The 
Chicago school system categorized students according to scores 
achieved on standardized intelligence tests. Instead of looking to 
the actual classification system, Judge· Grady only looked to the 
tests used by the Chicago schools. Rather than examining the im­
pact of the school system's use of the tests on the black student 
population, the judge focused upon the form of the tests. When a 
classification system is challenged on an equal protection clause ba­
sis, as it was in PASE, the courts apply a rational relation test. 
When the action of a school system is rationally related to the ends 
which it hopes to achieve, the courts are not likely to forbid the ac­
tion. Courts support legislative enactments that do not infringe 
upon fundamental rights or suspect classes. 31 
The following section will expiore the educational and psycho­
logical concepts underlying the Chicago school system's classifica­
tion scheme. First, students were grouped according to intelli­
gence as measured by scores achieved on standardized tests. 
Students were then placed into homogeneous groups with students 
who achieved similar test scores. The group of students receiving 
the lowest scores was placed into a curriculum designed for the ed­
ucable mentally handicapped. PASE questioned the validity of the 
educational policy underlying the EMH program. Intelligence and 
intelligence testing and student tracking are crucial components of 
the EMH system. 
A. Intelligence 
In the early twentieth century intelligence tests purported to 
measure the fixed, innate ability of individuals. 32 The theory un­
derlying this concept was that intelligence was purely hereditary: 
genes were considered to be determinative of intelligence. 33 This 
"genotype" concept of intelligence takes into account only innate 
genetic potential. It disregards environmental influences that inter­
30. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Justice Powell, 
writing for the Court, said that racial and ethnic distinctions of all sorts are inher­
ently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination. Id. at 292. 
31. 411 U.S. at 40. 
32. J. FINCHER, HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 185 (1976). 
33. See generally J. GUILFORD, THE NATURE OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 349-59 
(1967); D. WECHSLER, WECHSLER'S MEASUREMENT AND ApPRAISAL OF ADULT IN­
TELLIGENCE (4th ed. 1978). 
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act with genes. A number of broad studies have attempted to 
prove that genetic factors, rather than environmental factors, con­
trol individuals' intelligence.34 The genetic construct of intelli­
gence, however, generally has been rejected. 35 The "phenotype" 
construct factors environmental influences into the concept of intel­
ligence. Influences upon the fetus during the developmental stages 
within the mother's womb as well as external environmental influ­
ences upon the child following birth thus are included. 36 
Most intelligence tests do not purport to measure either geno­
type or phenotype intelligence but to evaluate "ordinary" intelli­
gence. 37 These tests simply measure intelligence from the child's 
behavior and responses to the test questions and tasks he is asked 
to perl'orm. The child is presented with a wide variety of tasks that 
are presumed to be an adequate sampling of important intellectual 
functions. The child's ability to respond to this sample then is,de­
termined to be reflective of hi~ general level of intellectual func­
tioning. 38 Intelligence tests normally provide a single score, such 
as an intelligence quotient (IQ), which indicates the child's intellec­
tual level based upon that specific test. The manual supplied with 
the WISC-R states that "the intelligence which [the] test purports 
to measure is the overall capacity of an individual to understand 
and cope with the world around him. Such capacity is inferred 
from the ways ability is manifested. "39 
34. See generally J. HUNT, INTELLIGENCE AND EXPERIENCE (1961); INTELLI­
GENCE: GENETIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES (R. Cancro, ed. 1971); A. 
JENSEN, GENETICS AND EDUCATION (1972); L. KAMIN, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS 
OF I.Q. (1974); RACE AND IQ (A. Montagu, ed. 1975); A. SHUEY, THE TESTING OF 
NEGRO INTELLIGENCE (1958). These studies do not provide any guidance for the 
measurement of innate intelligence. Rather, race or some other genetic determinant 
is considered to proscribe the limits of intelligence for the majority of that genetic 
type. Geneticists argue that blacks have a lower basis of intelligence due to natural 
selection. Although exceptions can be demonstrated, the intelligence curve of blacks 
will fall one standard deviation below whites. See Larry P. v. Riles, 3 EHLR 551:295 
(1979). It does not appear possible to develop an intelligence test that is culture free 
or free from other environmental influences. Thus, measurement of pure genetic in­
telligence is impossible. 
35. See note 33 supra. See also Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Stand­
ardized Ability Tests in Employment and Education, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 691, 692-93 
(1968); Note, The Legal Implications of Cultural Bias in the Intelligence Testing of 
.Disadvantaged School Children, 61 GEO. L. J. 1027, 1029 n.9 (1973). 
36. See note 33 supra. 
37. Id. 
38. See A. ANASTASI, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 188 (3d ed. 1968). 
39. WISC-R Manual, 5 (1974). Ten categories of ability are measured by the 
WISC-R: General information, general comprehension, arithmetic, similarities, vo­
cabulary, picture completion, block design, object assembly, and coding. Id. at 8. 
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A child's intelligence may be measured accurately through the 
use of standardized tests only if the testing instrument is standard­
ized upon a large, representative sample of children. If such stand­
ardization does not occur, the test cannot be considered a valid in­
dicator of intellectual functioning. 4o Intelligence tests generally, 
and the Stanford-Binet and Wechsler Scales specifically, have been 
standardized through national samples of school children. 41 
Validation studies42 demonstrate that the test measures what it 
purports to measure. When validation studies are complete, a test 
that is valid for the purpose it was designed to achieve· may be 
used solely to examine that for which it was validated. 43 The three 
tests litigated in PASE were not validated for the purpose of 
placing students into specific classifications within the Chicago 
schools. 
40. The standardization sample used by Wechsler for the WISC-R included 200 
children in each of 11 age groups, or a total of 2,200 school children ranging in age 
from six and one half years to 16¥.! years. One hundred boys and 100 girls were in­
cluded at each age level. The racial percentages were 85% white and 15% nonwhite. 
The nonwhite category included Black, Chicano, Puerto Rican, Oriental, and Ameri­
can Indian children. The standardization sample used by Wechsler accurately re­
flected urban and rural populations and the occupational group of the head of house­
hold. The occupational groups used included: (1) Professional/technical; (2) 
managers, officials, proprietors, clerical, and sales; (3) craftsmen and foremen; (4) op­
eratives, service workers, farmers, and farm managers; (5) laborers, farm laborers, 
farm foremen. 
The original WISC did not categorize by race within its standardization sample. 
The occupational base was for the father of the children sampled rather than for the 
head of household as on the WISC-R. Like the newer version, the original did not 
include children from homes of the unemployed within its standardization sample. 
D. WECHSLER, WECHSLER INTELLIGENCE SCALE FOR ClDLDREN, MANUAL 7-9, 
(1949). See also note 130 infra. 
41. See note 40 supra. 
42. There are three methods by which to validate a test: Criterion validity, 
which correlates scores achieved on tests with ability to cope with the world; con­
struct validity, which identifies the psychological trait that underlies successful 
performance; and content validity, which representatively samples significant parts 
of what the child has learned. See generally A. ANASTASI, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTlNG, 
100-119 (3d ed. 1961). Validation studies determine how a test may be used. See, e.g. 
Larry P. v. Riles, 3 EHLR at 551:324. For example, a test validated as an indicator of 
students' school achievement must not be used as an indicator of students' intelli­
gence. Similarly, the results of such an achievement test administered to school chil­
dren must not be used to determine the capability of the teacher. See also 45 C.F.R. 
§ 84.35(b)(I) (1980); 45 C.F.R. § 121a.532(a)(2) (1980). 
43. It is interesting to note that the authors of the tests and those who develop 
the standardization samples have a preconceived notion that males' and females' 
scores will not vary because of sex while it is noted that scores of whites and 
nonwhites vary an average of 15 points, or one standard deviation, from the mean. In 
fact, the Stanford-Binet was modified at one time because the test yielded different 
scores for boys and girls and the test makers felt that such differences were 
unacceptable. See 3 EHLR at 551:314. 
828 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:821 
B. Classification or Tracking of Students 
In public schools standardized tests are used primarily to place 
students into homogeneous classmcations44 or "tracks." "Tracking" 
has become a widely accepted educational practice. 45 Academic 
ability is a relevant criterion for the placement of students simply 
due to the academic differences between students.46 The equal 
treatment required by the equal protection clause does not pro­
hibit the state or its schools from distinguishing among its citi­
zens. 47 
Hobson v. Hanson48 involved the impact of tracking on minor­
ity pupils. The track system consisted of four levels designed to 
meet the individual differences among students in the Washington, 
D. C. school system. The four levels included the intellectually 
gifted, the above average, the average, and the retarded. Each 
level of students was assigned to a self-contained curriculum. 49 The 
"special" track for retarded students provided limited, basic in­
struction. 
The court found that the track system deprived blacks and 
poor pupils of the right to an education equal to that afforded to af­
fluent students. The court dissolved the track system, basing its 
44. The United States Supreme Court noted in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 
(1965) that "mere classification ... does not of itself deprive a group of equal protec­
tion." [d. at 92. Although Carrington involved a fundamental right, the case is in­
structive because the Court allowed states to impose reasonable requirements but 
not to deny citizens of equal protection merely because of a particular classification. 
45. See generally Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D. D.C. 1967), cen. dis­
missed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968). 
46. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 511-13 (D.D.C. 1967). 
47. [d. at 511. 
48. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D. D.C. 1967). This case involved the placement of black 
children into the lowest tracks in the Washington, D.C. school system. Judge 
Wright's lIB-page opinion is recognized as the landmark case about school tracking 
systems. The track system as administered by the Washington, D.C. schools grouped 
students according to socio-economic and racial status rather than intellectual ability. 
Many black children were deprived of an education equal to that afforded more af­
fluent students. The tracking system was not flexible; students who entered the 
lowest tracks rarely were able to move into the higher tracks. Judge Wright held that 
the track system voided any rationality that might exist in homogeneous grouping. 
He ordered the track system abolished because it discriminated against the disadvan­
taged child, particularly the black child. 
49. Three tracks were provided for students within the elementary schools: 
"Basic," or "special academic," for retarded children; "general" for average and 
above average children; and "honors" for gifted pupils. At the high school level the 
"regular" track was added to allow the above average student to be prepared for 
college. For a full explanation of the track system as used in the Washington, D.C. 
schools at the time of this litigation, see 269 F. Supp. at 442-50. 
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decision on the large number of blacks in this "special" track as 
compared with the number of blacks in other, higher tracks. Sev­
eral other factors also persuaded Judge Wright to enjoin the track 
system: The lack of movement among tracks in spite of the pur­
ported flexibility of the system;50 the failure of the schools to pro­
vide remedial programs for retarded and emotionally handicapped 
children;51 and the use of standardized tests found to be culturally 
and racially biased. 52 The court held that the deprivation of equal 
educational opportunity violated both the equal protection and due 
process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 53 Judge Wright, 
however, expressed the opinion that ability grouping could be rea­
sonably related to the purpose of public education and that differ­
ential treatment is not offensive per se. Although courts tradi­
tionally have avoided determinations of educational policy, they 
have become active when such policies foster educational practices 
resulting in disparate classification by race. 54 
The Chicago schools use standardized test scores to place stu­
dents into homogeneous tracks. Unlike Judge Wright, Judge Grady 
examined only the tests, disregarding other factors that might have 
warranted dissolution of the track system. He did not discuss the 
lack of student movement among the tracks or the nonexistence of 
remedial programs. Most importantly, he gave little weight to the 
disproportionate number of black children placed in the EMH 
track. 55 
C. Educable Mentally Handicapped 
The Illinois school code mandates special classes for the educa­
ble mentally handicapped. 56 The curriculum for the EMH students 
50. 269 F. Supp. at 445, 464. 
51. Id. at 468, 469-73. 
52. [d. at 476-85. 
53. Id. at 511-12. 
54. See, e.g., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (separate but equal is inherently unequal); 
Moses v. Washington Parish School Bd., 330 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. La. 1971), affd, 
456 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1013 (1972) (assigning black 
children into homogeneous groups in recently desegregated school on basis of stand­
ardized ability and achievement tests violated the childrens' fourteenth amendment 
right to be treated equally, especially when blacks recently had been educated in in­
ferior schools). See notes 60 and 61 infra and accompanying text for discussion of 
disparate impact and disparate treatment theories. 
55. 3 EHLR at 552:109. 
56. Educable Mentally Handicapped is defined as: 

[C)hildren between the ages of 3 and 21 years who because of retarded in­

tellectual development as determined by individual psychological evalua­
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is designed for children who are unable to benefit from the pro­
gram of instruction offered in the regular classroom. Material is 
presented to these handicapped children at a slower pace than in 
the normal classroom. Emphasis is placed on teaching the skills 
that are necessary for independent living. The subject matter is 
oriented toward socialization, language skills, and vocational train­
ing. Academic subjects are taught on an elementary level with the 
objective of helping the child become economically independent. 57 
The label "mentally retarded" will remain with the child as a 
part of his permanent school record. A child placed into a class for 
the mentally handicapped usually will not be transferred to a regu­
lar class. Children who graduate from EMH programs in the 
Chicago school system are awarded special diplomas that do not 
qualify them to go on to college. 58 A child who is placed errone­
ously into such a program thus is deprived of the benefits that oth­
erwise would have been available to him during his school years. 
The child also is deprived of those opportunities normally available 
after graduation. 
III. ROLE OF THE COURTS IN EDUCATIONAL TESTING 
Equal educational opportunity cases are brought under legal 
theories that originate in the equal employment field, specifically 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 59 The two primary theo­
ries of discrimination created by title VII are disparate treatments° 
and disparate impact. 61 Disparate treatment occurs when similarly 
situated individuals or classes are treated differently because of 
tion are incapable of being educated profitably and effectively through ordi­
nary classroom instruction but who may be expected to benefit from special 
education facilities designed to make them economically useful and socially 
adjusted. 
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-1.04 (1977) (repealed 1979). "[S]pecial Education 
means specially designed instruction . . . to meet the unique needs . . . [of 
handicapped children]." 45 C.F.R. § 121a.14 (1980). Mentally retarded children are 
included among the handicapped. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (1980). Classes for mentally 
handicapped children are appropriate when the children have "significant sub­
average general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adap­
tive behavior and manifested during the developmental period, which adversely af­
fects a child's educational performance." 45 C.F.R. § 121a.5(b)(4) (1980). 
57. Larry P. v. Riles,3 EHLR 551:295 (1979). 
58. 3 EHLR 552:109. 
59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1970). 
60. See Martin v. Chrysler Corp., 10 FEP 329 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Slack v. Ha­
vens, 7 FEP 885 (S.D. Cal. 1973). 
61. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
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race. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green62 held that a prima facie 
case of disparate treatment is shown when: The plaintiff is a mem­
ber of a racial minority; he applied for a job; he had the requisite 
qualifications; he was denied employment; and the job remained 
open after his application was rejected. 63 The burden of proof then 
shifts to the defendant employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory 
reason for denying the plaintiff employment. 64 The plaintiff then 
must demonstrate that the employer's explanation was merely a 
pretext and that it was the employer's intent to preclude a minor­
ity from employment. Plaintiff will lose unless he proves that the 
employer's nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext. 65 Proof of in­
tent to discriminate, therefore, is crucial to a disparate treatment 
claim. 66 
The theory of disparate impact, as articulated by the United. 
States Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 67 is the sec­
ond ground for suit under title VII. Establishing a prima facie case 
of discriminatory impact, however, requires more proof than is 
needed under the disparate treatment theory. Plaintiffs usually use 
statistical evidence to establish a prima facie case. 68 A showing that 
a protected class69 suffers from a statistically significant discrimina­
tory impact is sufficient to establish the prima facie case. It is very 
difficult to establish a clear showing of· disparate impact. Such a 
showing may be disputed through use of a differing range of statis­
tics which indicates no significant impact. 7o If, however, the plain­
tiff is able to establish a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to 
the defendant to prove that the act which resulted in disparate im­
pact was based upon a husiness necessity or was job related. 71 
Washington v. Davis7 'l. involved the validity of a standardized 
62. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
63. Id. at 802. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 804. 
66. Id. at 805. 
67. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See also Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 
(1975); Larry P. v. Riles, 3 EHLR 551:295 (1979). 
68. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 428-36 (1975). See also 
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); Keyes v. School Dist. 
No. One, 413 U.S. 189 (1972). 
69. See note 24 supra and accompanying text. 
70. For an extended look at the use of statistical evidence by both parties, see 
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). 
71. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
72. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
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test73 used to predict candidates' potential for success as police offi­
cers in Washington, D.C. The test allegedly excluded a dispropor­
tionately large number of black applicants and was challenged as a 
discriminatory device violative of the fifth amendment74 and of 42 
U.S.C. § 1981. 75 The Court resolved Davis under a constitutional 
theory of equal protection and held that the fourteenth amendment 
required plaintiffs to prove defendant's intent to discriminate; a 
showing of discriminatory impact was inadequate. 76 
Plaintiffs were able to demonstrate disproportionate impact, 
but this showing was insufficient to sustain plaintiffs' cause of action 
because the case originally was brought under a constitutional 
theory, not under title VII. The Court explained that the strict 
scrutiny test normally applied in racial classification cases is not 
invoked when mere discriminatory impact is shown. Rather, inten­
tional or purposeful discriminatory treatment triggers the strict 
scrutiny test. 77 "Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is 
not the sole touchstone of invidious racial discrimination forbidden 
by the Constitution. "78 The Constitution did not require the Court 
to infer discrimination from disparate impact. To uphold the Davis 
testing scheme, therefore, the Court merely needed to find a ra­
tional relation between the test and the ends it purported to 
achieve. "The test is neutral on its face and rationally may be said 
to serve a purpose the government is Constitutionally empowered 
to pursue. "79 
The Supreme Court in Davis said, however, that when title 
73. Test 21 was used by the District of Columbia as an objective measurement 
standard for police recruits. The test was validated to show likelihood of success at 
the police academy; it was not validated to show the candidate's chance of success as 
a police officer. ld. at 235. 
74. "[Tlhe Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal pro­
tection component prohibiting the United States from invidiously discriminating be­
tween individuals or groups." Id. at 239. 
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides in part, "All persons within the jurisdic­
tion of the United States shall have the same right in every state and territory ... to 
the full and equal benefit of all laws ... as enjoyed by white citizens...." 
76. 426 U.S. at 238-39. In a concurring opinion in Davis, Justice Stevens con­
ceded that: 
[flrequently the most probative evidence of intent will be objective evi­
dence of what actually happened rather than evidence describing the sub­
jective state of mind of the actor. For normally the actor is presumed to have 
intended the natural consequences of his deeds. This is particularly true in 
the case of governmental action which is frequently the product of compro­
mise, of collective decision making and of mixed motivation. 
Id. at 253. 
77. Id. at 242. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 246. 
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VII is applicable and when disproportionate impact is demon­
strated by the plaintiff, it is not enough for the defendant employer 
to show a rational basis for the challenged practice; he also must 
validate80 the practice. 81 The Court thus has shifted the burden of 
proof in title VII cases from the plaintiff who demonstrates dispro­
portionate impact to the defendant employer who must validate the 
test against an acceptable standard. 82 
In Larry P. v. Riles, 83 the district court invalidated California's 
system of classifying black children for Educable Mentally Re­
tarded (EMR)84 classes. The court held that the use of standardized 
intelligence tests85 that are racially and culturally biased and that 
have not been validated86 for the purpose of placing children into 
EMR classes violated the California Constitution, the United States 
Constitution, and United States statutes. 87 The court, in an ex­
haustive analysis of standardized testing, cultural bias, test adminis­
tration procedures, and EMR placement, permanently enjoined 
the State of California from using standardized tests to place chil­
dren permanently into EMR classes. 88 Plaintiffs in PASE relied 
strongly on Larry P. because the cases shared similar facts. 




PASE embodies constitutional as well as statutory issues. This 
section will explore the constitutional questions that arise under 
80. See note 42 supra. 
81. 426 U.S. at 246-47. 
82. Acceptable standards include: Job relatedness, achievement, proficiency, 
and academic success. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regulations re­
quire that the "validity of a job qualification test be proven by empirical data 
demonstrating that the test is predictive or significantly correlated with important el ­
ements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which 
candidates are being evaluated." Id. at 264 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 29 
C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1975». 
83. 3 EHLR at 551:295. 
84. Educable mentally retarded is synonymous with educable mentally 
handicapped and is simply the designation used in California. 
85. The same three intelligence tests used by the Chicago school system were 
used in the California system. They are discussed throughout Larry P. 
86. See note 42 supra. 
87. 3 EHLR at 551:336. Larry P. challenged the California schools under the 
fourteenth amendment equal protection clause, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 
29 U.S.c. § 794 (1970), the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. § 
1401 (1970), Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1970), and the 
Equal Educational Opportunity Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (1976). 
88. Larry P. is a 125-page opinion discussing each of these areas. The district 
court concluded that the California school system was discriminating on the basis of 
race. 3 EHLR at 551:339. 
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equal protection clause claims and then will examine the issues 
that arise under the various federal statutes. 
As noted in Davis, plaintiffs' equal protection claim will suc­
ceed only if they can prove intent to discriminate. A demonstration 
of discriminatory impact is insufficient. To develop a cause of ac­
tion under the fourteenth amendment in education cases, a plaintiff 
must prove that the defendant school board intended to create and 
us.e a racial classification. 89 PASE apparently was able to demon­
strate· a racially discriminatory impact by showing that eighty-two 
percent of the students ip EMH classes were black while only
I 
sixty-two percent of the school population was black. 90 Judge Gra­
dy'sopinion indicates that PASE had no evidence that the school 
intended to use these standardized tests for a discriminatory pur­
pose. ILthe plaintiff fails to prove intent or if the defendant ade­
qua,tely rebuts the. proof,' the court then is required to evaluate the 
classification on the basis of a rational relation test. 
The constitutionality of classifications based on standardized 
test scores also is judged by a rational relation test. 91 The classifica­
tion method must be rationally related to the goals to be achieved. 
To invalidate a classification scheme under the rational relation 
test, plaintiff must show that the classification is arbitrary, that it 
does not have a fair and substantial relation to the object of the 
legislation, or that the legislation is not supported by a legitImate 
state interest. 92 When the constitutionality of a state-imposed dlS­
sification system based upon intelligence is at issue, equal protec­
tion analysis focuses upon whether the method of classification 
promotes legitimate state interests. 93 
A rational relation is easy to demonstrate in these situations. 
"[E]ducators almost universally favor ability grouping of stu­
dents. "94 Testing devices are used to discover special learning 
problems. If such problems exist and are not discovered, the child 
may lose his ability to cope within the regular classroom. He may 
89. United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094 (D.C.S.C. 1977), aII'd 
sub nom. National Educ. Ass'n v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978). 
90. 3 EHLR at 552:109. 
91. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); United States v. South Carolina, 
445 F. Supp. 1094 (D.C.S.C. 1977); Cuyahoga County Ass'n for Retarded Children & 
Adults v. Essex, 411 F. Supp. 46 (N.D. Ohio 1976). 
92. Cuyahoga County Ass'n for Retarded Children & Adults v. Essex, 411 F. 
Supp. 46, 50 (N.D. Ohio 1976). 
93. See Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEXAS L. 
REV. 411 (1973); J. Coleman, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966)., 
94. YudofI, supra note 93, at 425. 
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be ridiculed by his peers and feel that he is a failure. Allowing the 
constitutionality of testing programs to be judged by a rational rela­
tion . standard places an insurmountable burden on the plaintiff. 
Proving a violation of a child's cpnstitutional rights is virtually im­
possible under the rational relation test. 
A. Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1974 
The Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 197495 requires the 
plaintiff to prove intent to discriminate. The Act itself reads: "no 
State shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on 
account of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin by­
[a.] the deliberate segregation by an educational agency of students 
on the basis of race, color or national origin among or within 
schools ..... "96 The requirement of deliberate segregation demon­
strates that the intent to segregate must be proven in order for the 
plaintiff to succeed under this Act. The recent district court case of 
Otero v. Mesa County Valley School District97 held that the Act 
will not permit recovery when discriminatory impact has been es­
'tablished but when intent to discriminate has not. 
, Segregation of students on one of the bases noted in the stat­
ute would result in discrimination, thus deliberate segregation may 
be read as deliberate discrimination. Though the Equal Educa­
tional Opportunity Act does not specify the standard of scrutiny by 
which infractions will be judged, the stated intent requirement 
points to a mere rational relation test . 
. The' intent requirement of the Equal Educational Opportunity 
Act of 1974 would require PASE to prove that the school system 
intended the classification to operate on a racial basis. The intent 
standard again would foreclose PASE from successfully suing under 
the A~t. 
B. Title Vi of the Civil Rights Act as Amended 
The issues involved in title VII cases are paralleled in title VI 
suits. 98 Title VI provides that: "[n]o person in the United States 
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origins be excluded 
95. 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (1976). 
96: 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (1976) (emphasis added). 
97. 470 F. Supp. 326 (D.C. Colo. 1979). 
98. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Serna v. Portales School Dist., 499 
F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974); Soria v. Oxnard School Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 386 F. 
Supp. 539 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967). 
836 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:821 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal fi­
nancial assistance. "99 
The purpose of the legislation was to protect, and provide ef­
fective means to enforce, the civil rights of persons within the ju­
risdiction of the United States. lOO Two of the legislation's objectives 
were to authorize the attorney general to initiate suits to deseg­
regate public schoolslol and to prohibit discrimination in any finan­
cial assistance program. 102 The Code of Federal Regulations states: 
[a] recipient . . . [of federal aid], ... may not ... utilize 
criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of 
subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, 
color or national origin or have the effect of defeating or sub­
stantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the pro­
gram as respect individuals of a particular race, color, or national 
origin. loa 
The Board of Education of the City of Chicago has received fi­
nancial assistance from the federal government and therefore is le­
gally required to comply with title VI. Since title VI applies to all 
aspects of the educational program,104 Chicago's EMH program 
must comply or the city will lose federal financial assistance. 
Defendant school board argued that a title VI challenge could 
not succeed without proof of intent to discriminate. Nothing in the 
languag~ of title VI, however, requires proof of intent. The words 
"have the effect" merely imply that defendant's criteria resulted in 
a discribinatory impact. 
Other civil rights statutes that reject an intent requirement 
should be influe.ntial in the interpretation of title VI. Cases inter­
preting title VII have held that even an unintended impact consti­
tutes a violation. lOS Title VIII, regarding housing equality, also 
does not require a showing of intent to discriminate. Instead, it 
proscribes housing practices with racially segregative conse­
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1976). 
100. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1964, reprinted in [1964] U.S. 
CODE CONG & An. NEWS 2391, 2391. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1980) (emphasis added). 
104. Board of Pub. Instruction of Taylor County v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th 
Cir. 1969). 
105. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
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quences. 106 Under both titles VII and VIII, proof of racial disparity 
constitutes a prima facie case. 107 
Plaintiffs in PASE showed that eighty-two percent of the stu­
dents in EMH classes in Chicago were black and that sixty-two 
percent of the school population was black. los Plaintiffs established 
a prima facie case of racial discrimination by demonstrating that 
this disproportionate impact was caused by standardized tests not 
validated for EMH placement. When the plaintiff presents un­
disputed statistical evidence that a disproportionately large number 
of black students were placed in EMH classes, he has met his ini­
tial burden to make a prima facie showing. The burden of proof 
then shifts to the defendant to rebut this prima facie showing 
by demonstrating a substantial justification for the challenged 
policy. 100 
Lau v. Nichols,llo which involved challenges under the Con­
stitution and title VI, illustrates the mechanics of title VI. Plaintiffs 
sued the San Francisco school district to protest its refusal to pro­
vide bilingual education for Chinese students who did not speak 
English. Plaintiffs presented no proof of intent to discriminate. 111 
The Court held that title VI prohibits discrimination "even though 
no purposeful design is present. . . . "112 The disproportionate 
placement of black children into EMH classes in Chicago similarly 
penalizes black children. Like the children in Lau, they are de­
prived of a meaningful education. 
Lora v. Board of Education of New York 113 is similar in many 
106. Metropolitan HollS. Dev. Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th 
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 
F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Whitman Area Improvement Council 
v. Resident Bd., 435 U.S. 908 (1978). 
107. See notes 105 and 106 supra. 
108. 3 EHLR at 552:108. 
109. 411 U.S. at 802. 
110. 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
111. ld. at 569 (Stewart, J., with Burger, C.J., & Blackmun, J., concurring). 
112. ld. at 568. 
113. 456 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated, 623 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1980). 
The City of New York appealed and the Second Circuit vacated the district court 
judgment, concluding that intent, not mere impact, was necessary in a title VI claim. 
Id. at 250. The Second Circuit relied upon Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130 
(1979), but the Supreme Court in Harris expressly reserved opinion on the appropri­
ate standard in title VI cases. id. at 149. See also HEW Regulations designed to im­
plement title VI, 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(I)-(3) (1980). A number of federal court cases 
also have held that a mere impact standard is appropriate under title VI, e.g. Lau v. 
Nichols, 414 U.S. at 568; Board of Educ. v. Califano, 584 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1978), 
afI'd. on other grounds sub nom. Board of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979). 
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respects to PASE. The Federal District Court for the Eastern Dis­
trict of New York applied a discriminatory impact standard to 
claims brought by black children challenging placement into special 
day schools. Plaintiff argued that the tests were racially biased and 
that they were overemphasized as indicators of student ability. The 
defense claimed that the tests were merely a portion of a total eval­
uation process and that the diagnosticians were told to consider 
the "socio-economic pluralism" of the students. 114 The district court 
found a violation of title VI because plaintiff showed that defen­
dant's conduct had a racially discriminatory effect. No intent to dis­
criminate was needed. 115 . 
As noted 'in Larry 'P., once the prima facie showing of dis­
parate impact has been made, the defendant may rebut by show­
ing that disproportionate enrollment in EMH classes actually re­
flects a greater incidence of mental retardation among black chil­
dren. 11s In addition, if the defendants are able to show that the 
tests have been validated for the placement of black children into 
EMH classes, the tests then may be used in spite of their dispro­
portionate impact. 
C. 	 Handicapped Persons and Section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973117 was designed 
to eliminate discrimination on the basis of handicap in any program 
or activity receiving federal financial assi~tance.118 A handicapped 
person is defined as "any person who (i) has a physical or mental 
impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activi­
ties, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as 
having such an impairment. "119 
The Chicago schools receive money through federal assistance 
programs and thus are required to comply with section 504. Cer­
tain regulations implementing section 504120 deal specifically with 
114. 456 F. Supp, at 1243, People from varying cultural, social, or economic 
backgrounds are different; each pupil must be considered with his unique qualities 
in mind, 
115, Id. at 1277. "A prima facie violation of Title VI would be established if it 
were shown that referrals and policies [and) practices, , , which have a racially dis­
criminatory effect as evidenced by the overrepresentation of minority students in 
these schools," Id. 
116, 3 EHLR at 551:322, 

117, Pub, L. 93-112, 87 STAT, 355, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976), as amended by Pub. 

L. 95-602, 92 STAT. 2982, 29 U,S.C. § 794 (1978), 
118, 45 C.F.R. § 84,1 (1980), 
119. 45 C.F.R. § 84,30) (1980), 
120, 45 C,F.R. § 84,34 (1980), 
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evaluation and placement121 of handicapped students. The regula­
tions specifY criteria for evaluation procedures such as those for 
standardized tests: 
[a] recipient to which this subpart applies [public schools] shall 
establish standards and procedures for the evaluation and place­
ment of persons who, because of handicap, need ... special ed­
ucation or related services which ensure that: 
1. Tests . . . have been validated for the specific purpose for 
which they are used ... ; 
2. Tests and other evaluation material include those tailored to 
assess specific areas of educational need and are not merely 
those which are designed to provide a single general intelligence 
quotient. 122 
Neither the Stanford-Binet nor the Wechsler Scales have been vali­
dated for the purpose of classifYing students into EMH classes. 
These tests have not not been tailored to. assess specific areas of 
educational need but are designed to provide a general intelligence 
quotient. The Chicago school system's use of these tests, therefore, 
appears to violate section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Their use 
for the placement of handicapped children should be discontinued 
on that basis alone. 
V. PASE 
Judge John F. Grady, author of the PASE opInIOn, did not 
deal with any of the preceding legal theories or statutes. Instead, 
Judge Grady evaluated the individual test questions and concluded 
that eight questions on the WISC and WISC-R tests and one ques­
tion on the Stanford-Binet test were culturally biased. 123 The judge 
used his own criteria to determine whether the questions were 
biased. Judge Grady, who believed that the expert testimony re­
garding bias was not conclusive, chose to disregard the testimony 
of the expert witnesses presented by the parties. 124 
121. 45 C.F.R. § 84.35 (1980). 
122. 45 C.F.R. § 84.35(b)(I), (b)(2) (1978). 
123. 3 -EHLR at 552: 135. Judge Grady found the following questions to be ra­
cially biased: (1) What is the color of rubies?; (2) What does C.O.D. mean?; (3) Why 
is it better to pay bills by check than by cash?; (4) What would you do if you were 
sent to the store to buy a loaf of bread and the grocer said he didn't have any more?; 
(5) What does a stomach do?; (6) Why is it generally better to give money to an or­
ganized charity than to a street beggar?; (7) What are you supposed to do if you find 
someone's wallet or pocketbook in a store?; (8) What is the thing to do if a boy (girl) 
much smaller than yourself starts a fight with you? Id. 
On the Stanford-Binet test, the one item which Judge Grady found to be biased 
was a question asking the four-and-one-half-year-old child to identify which of two 
persons, shown on cards, was prettier. Id. 
124. Judge Grady cited Federal Rule of Evidence 702 regarding expert 
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Plaintiff's experts had participated in Larry P., 125 which had 
been decided for plaintiff less than one year earlier. Plaintiff's 
counsel did not anticipate the judge's approach so they did not pre­
pare their expert witnesses by reviewing each of the specific test 
items. Thus, the witnesses were unprepared to respond adequately 
to Judge Grady when he asked them about individual test ques­
tions.l26 Individual test questions were not examined in Larry P. 
because Judge Peckham of the California District Court did not 
find it necessary, choosing instead to deal with the legal issues. 127 
Judge Peckham stated that the cultural bias of the tests was "hardly 
disputed in this litigation. "128 
Experts within the fields of education, psychology, and psy­
chological testing have stated that the WISC and Stanford-Binet in­
telligence tests are culturally biased against blacks.. Dr. David 
Wechsler conceded that the WISC was developed for an all-white 
population and that no attempts were made to validate the test for 
use by the black population. 129 The WISC-R was restandardized in 
1972 to include a fifteen percent nonwhite population, but this 
restandardization was not an attemp~ to validate test items for mi­
norities. 130 In Larry P. the court noted that black children raised 
in a cultural environment closer to the white middle-class main­
stream tend to perform better on the tests and that early interven­
tion· programs such as Head Start improve test scores of black chil­
dren. 13l In addition, it has been said that, "Each culture fosters 
and encourages the development of behavior that is adapted to its 
values and demands. When an individual must adjust to and com­
pete within a culture or sub-culture other than that in which he 
witnesses. He stated that expert testimony is not conclusive. Rather, it is to help 
factfinders to understand complicated material. 3 EHLR at 552:110 n.3. 
125. 3 EHLR at 551:295. 
126. 3 EHLR at 552:111. 
127. 3 EHLR at 551:318. 
128. [d. at 551:317. 
129. D. WECHSLER, MEASUREMENT OF INTELLIGENCE 107 (1944). 
130. See note 40 supra and accompanying text regarding the standardization 
sample used in the WISC-R. The standardization sample for the Stanford-Binet in 
1916 was on an all-white population of 1000 children and 400 adults. The 1937 revi­
sion of the standardization used 3000 all-white schoolchildren. No new standardiza­
tion was made for the 1960 revision. In 1972 a new population sample was drawn 
from locales in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Texas, and Utah. There 
probably were some black children tested within these locales but only to the extent 
of the proportion of blacks actually living within the test school districts. No identifi­
cation by race was made by the examiners. 3 EHLR at 551:316 n.64. 
131. 3 EHLR at 551:316. 
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was reared, then cultural difference is likely to become cultural 
disadvantage. "132 
Federal law prohibits the use of tests that result in racial 
imbalance within classification schemes. 133 One prior district court 
decision found the use of the WISC, WISC-R, and Stanford-Binet 
tests to have a disparate impact upon black children in EMH 
placement.134 Rather than consider Larry P. as precedent, Judge 
Grady chose to review the individual test items and to disregard 
the legal issues raised by PASE. If Judge Grady had considered 
the issues and examined each one separately, PASE would have 
succeeded on some of its theories but would have failed on others. 
The claim that PASE brought under the fourteenth amend­
ment's equal protection clause could not have succeeded. It is un­
likely that such a claim would survive under a rational relation test. 
In PASE, the court undoubtedly would have found the school's use 
of these standardized tests to be rationally related to the ability 
grouping of students: A legitimate state goal. Similarly, the Equal 
Educational Opportunity Act claim would fail because the statute 
expressly requires intent, and Otero considered intent vital to a 
cause of action under the Act. 13S 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and the Education of All 
Act136Handicapped Children are funding statutes. Section 504 
prohibits discrimination against handicapped persons by programs 
receiving federal funding. Title VI prohibits racial discrimination in 
the administration of 'educational programs receiving federal fund­
ing. The Education of All Handicapped Children Act conditions re­
ceipt of federal funds on the use of tests and evaluation procedures 
which are neither racially nor culturally discriminatory. A finding 
for plaintiff based upon anyone of these statutes should have been 
sufficient to warrant an injunction against use of the tests by the 
Chicago school system. 
A disproportionate impact theory should be used to prove a vi­
olation of each of these funding statutes. Discriminatory impact was 
shown in PASE: eighty-two percent of the EMH population was 
132. A. ANASTASI, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 241 (3d ed. 1970). 
133. See note 119 supra and accompanying text. 
134. Larry P. specifically considered the three tests which were at issue in 
PASE. 3 EHLR at 551:295. 
135. 470 F. Supp. at 331 (reference is made to 20 U.S.C. § 1703). See also text 
accompanying note 82 supra. 
136. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(c) (1976). 
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black while only sixty-two percent of the school population was 
black. This was sufficient to prove a prima facie case of race dis­
crimination and to place the burden of proof upon the defense to 
demonstrate a substantial justification for the use of its testing cri­
teria in the placement of students into EMH classes. 
The three standardized tests discussed in Judge Grady's opin­
ion may be fair in form. The tests consist of many sections and lev­
els of competence and cover a wide variety of areas. After a thor­
ough analysis of each question he found a total of nine biased 
questions. Yet a disproportionately large number of black children 
score poorly on the tests and, as a result of those scores, are placed 
into EMH classes. 137 If the questions themselves are not biased, 
some other portion of the placement procedure must affect black 
children adversely. Perhaps the high proportion of black children 
in EMH· classes does accurately reflect the fact that there is a 
higher percentage of mentally handicapped black children in the 
Chicago schools. If some other portion of the placement procedure 
is causing the disproportionate impact, however, section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act is being violated. Section 504 states that "[nlo 
otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall, solely by rea­
son of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination . . . . "138 
The two children with learning disabilities represented by PASE 
were placed into EMH classes. Whether the placement was based 
upon poor test scores or on some other facet of the evaluative pro­
cess, these two otherwise qualified pupils were, by reason of 
their handicap, excluded from participation in the regular school 
curriculum. 
If the disproportion of blacks in EMH classes in Chicago is 
caused by natural forces, then the theories of intelligence discussed 
earlier need to be reevaluated. 139 If EMH classes were directed to­
ward students with deficiencies in phenotype or ordinary intelli­
gence, the educators would continuously evaluate the students and 
upgrade their expectations of the students because both theories of 
intelligence recognize that scores on intelligence tests can be im­
proved. 140 By providing greater stimulation within the pupil's envi­
137. 3 EHLR at 552: 138. The testimony of experts shows that the largest corre­
lation between the placement program employed by the Chicago schools and the 
children actually placed into EMH classes is low test scores. Id. 
138. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1978). 
139. See notes 32-38 supra and accompanying text. 
140. See note 56 supra. 
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ronment and by teaching the pupil to cope effectively with the 
world around him, intelligence quotients, as measured by these 
tests, can be improved. 141 If children are placed into EMH classes 
based upon phenotype or ordinary intelligence, they should be 
able to improve their scores and return to the regular classroom. 
This would require a program of compensatory or remedial group­
ing142 rather than continuous grouping,143 the system used in 
Chicago's EMH program. 
Judge Grady did not consider genetic intelligence to he an 
acceptable concept. 144 Purely genetic considerations of intelligence 
do not seem reasonable. The use of continuous grouping where 
neither the tests nor other evaluative material are considered 
biased leads, however, to the conclusion that the poor snowing by 
blacks in the Chicago schools can be attributed to the existence of 
a larger percentage of mentally handicapped blacks. Although this 
conclusion seems neither realistic nor reasonable, it, exists as one 
explanation for the significant diffzrence in the percentage of blacks 
in Chicago's EMH classes as compared with the general school 
population in Chicago. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The curriculum of the EMH program in the Chicago schools is 
inferior to that provided within the normal classroom. The suit 
brought by PASE requested an injunction against the Chicago 
schools to prevent the continued use of standardized tests as a tool 
for placing students into EMH classes. Low scores on standardized 
tests were the sole constant factor found for all children in the 
EMH program although the tests are only a portion of the place­
ment process. Eighty-two percent of the EMH classes are black 
while only sixty-two percent of the school population is black. This 
allows a plaintiff to allege that the EMH placement process has' a 
disproportionate impact upon the bla9k population. Under a theory 
of disparate impact, PASE could have, developed a prima facie 
showing of discrimination thereby shifting the burden to defendant 
to rebut such showing. , ' 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, section 504 of the Re­
141. See note 48 and text accompanying notes' 50-54 supra. 
142. See notes 32-38 supra and accompanying text. Remedial grouping antic­
ipates movement from lower to higher tracks through improvement in test scores. 
143. Continuous grouping ,does not anticipate movement of-students' to higher 
tracks nor does it anticipate improvement in 'test scores. ' 
144. 3 EHLR at '552:136. ' , 
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habilitation Act, and the Education for All Handicapped Children 
Act all appear to have been violated by the Chicago schools. The 
"fair in form"145 evaluation applied by the court to the tests short­
circuits the legal questions. Each of the legal issues that were elim­
inated by Judge Grady's factual analysis are those which deal with 
federal fipancing. Although plaintiff sought merely declaratory and 
injunctive relief, it is likely that federal educational funds would 
have been affected by a decision adverse to the city schools. Judge 
Grady's decision, based upon the bias in individual test questions, 
prevented the interruption of federal funding to the Chicago school 
system. 
The question that must be answered, and that should have 
been answered in PASE, is not whether these tests are racially 
biased but whether the test results have a discriminatory impact 
upon a protected population. To answer this question a court must 
consider statistical evidence presented by both parties, rather than 
examine individual test questions for racial or cultural bias. 
Peter C. Sipperly 
145. 401 U.S. at 431 (1971). Chief Justice Burger, while 'addressing the impact 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on employment, stated that, "[tlhe Act proscribes not 
only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in 
operation." Id. 
